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AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY
ZIVOTOFSKY II’S TWO VISIONS FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Harlan Grant Cohen*
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),1 was the
open disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts. What Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, holding that the President has exclusive power to recognize states and governments and that Congress
cannot constitutionally impinge on that power by requiring the President to list Israel in the passports of U.S.
citizens born in Jerusalem, means for future foreign relations law cases is something of a puzzle. Solving it
requires understanding the two competing visions at the case’s center and the fluctuating relationship between
the two Justices who hold them.
I. The Roberts-Kennedy Foreign Relations Law Fulcrum
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts have been allies in most of the Roberts Court’s foreign relations
law jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy joined the Chief Justice’s majority opinions in Medellín,2 Kiobel,3 Zivotofsky I,4
and Bond5 and his dissent in BG Group.6 Chief Justice Roberts joined Justices Kennedy’s majority opinion Arizona v. United States.7 But there have been notable disagreements. Justice Kennedy concurred in Justice Stevens’
majority opinion in Hamdan.8 The Chief Justice did not take part in the Court’s decision, but as Circuit court
judge, authored the DC Circuit opinion that the Court overruled. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
in Boumediene9 with the Chief Justice writing a vociferous dissent.10 And even as he joined the Chief Justice’s
majority opinion in Kiobel,11 Justice Kennedy added a concurrence in many ways at odds with the majority’s
logic.12

* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to Pamela Bookman, Rebecca Ingber, Shalev Roisman, and Carlos
Vázquez.
Originally published online 20 July 2015.
1 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II].
2 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
3 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
4 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012).
5 Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014).
6 BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014).
7 Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012).
8 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557(2006).
9 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
10 Id. at 2278-2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
11 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659.
12 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10
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These moments of disagreement are revealing. As I have explained elsewhere,13 the dominant trend in Robert’s Court foreign relations law jurisprudence has been a shift from functionalist approaches and rhetoric
toward formalist ones. Whereas the Court has in the past used functionalist logic to empower the political
branches in foreign relations, the Roberts Court has been methodically reining them in, using the rhetoric of
formalism to subject foreign relations to judicial scrutiny by narrowing the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I14 and to tie the political branches to clear statutory and constitutional authorizations, denying the
President authority to order Texas to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in Medellín
in the absence of specific Congressional action,15 and using presumptions in Morrison,16 Kiobel,17 and Bond18 to
narrow discretion in the absence of clear Congressional mandates. Chief Justice Roberts has been at the forefront of this trend, authoring many of the Court’s signature formalist opinions.
Justice Kennedy’s opinions do not join this trend from functionalism to formalism. Boumediene took a highly
functionalist, pragmatic approach to both the history and purpose of habeas corpus and to its application to
specific situations.19 In this regard, Boumediene is an heir to Justice Kennedy’s pre-Roberts Court concurrences
on Rasul v. Bush20 and Verdugo-Urquidez,21 in which he borrowed Justice Harlan’s pragmatic “what process is
due”22 approach to constitutional rights. Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent in Boumediene, condemned the unpredictable nature of Justice Kennedy’s multi-factor analysis.23 In Arizona, Justice Kennedy adopted a functionalist
view of immigration and preemption. Noting the serious foreign policy implications of immigration law and
enforcement, Justice Kennedy was quick to preempt state laws that might undermine Congress’ and the President’s carefully balanced immigration policies.24 And in Kiobel, concurring in Chief Justice Roberts majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy struck a blow for pragmatism, emphasizing that “[t]he opinion for the Court is careful
to leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”25
II. Formalism and Functionalism in Zivotofsky II
This fissure is powerfully evident in Zivotofsky II. For Justice Kennedy, the President’s exclusive power to
recognize states and governments is a practical function of constitutional structure. All means of recognition—
receiving an ambassador, negotiating a treaty, sending an ambassador, or opening diplomatic channels—are
“dependent on Presidential power.” Beyond that, “the Nation must have a single policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States.” “[T]he Nation must ‘speak with one voice,’” and the
President is better situated to take “decisive, unequivocal action” and to engage “in delicate and often secret
Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015).
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.Ct. 1421 (2012).
15 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 529–30.
16 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
17 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664.
18 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091.
19 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2276-2277.
20 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990).
22 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
23 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
24 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2492.
25 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13
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diplomatic contacts.”26 Justice Kennedy wrote of “logical and proper inference,”27 of “functional considerations,”28 and of “common sense and necessity.”29 Even as he buries Justice Sutherland’s famous functionalist
pro-President dicta in Curtiss-Wright,30 Justice Kennedy revealed himself Sutherland’s true heir, embracing the
logic and tropes that defined Sutherland-authored opinions in Curtiss-Wright31 and Belmont.32
This functionalism extends too to Justice Kennedy’s use of history.33 Much as in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy
found the historical practice to be complicated and contestable.34 Adopting a holistic and functional approach
though, he concluded that “on balance [the history] provides strong support for the conclusion that the recognition power is the President’s alone.”35 Justice Kennedy’s approach stands in contrast to the stricter requirement
that a practice be “‘open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic’” endorsed by
Justice Thomas.36
None of this analysis passed muster with the more formalist Chief Justice. Dissenting, Chief Justice Roberts
takes a more formalist, textualist view of the Reception clause of the U.S. Constitution. For him, the clause
creates a Presidential duty to receive ambassadors rather than a Presidential power.37 And neither the precedents
nor the history discussed by Justice Kennedy would have met Chief Justice Roberts’ stricter standards for the
use of either.38
But at the heart of the disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts are their competing
approaches to Justice Jackson’s famous Youngstown concurrence39 and its tripartite analysis of separation of
powers questions. Justice Kennedy read the framework as a flexible one. Because the President is, in this case,
acting contrary to a clear statutory mandate, “his claim must be ‘scrutinized with caution.’”40 That said, Justice
Jackson left some room for the President to act even in that third category, and as Justice Kennedy noted,
“when a Presidential power is ‘exclusive,’” as Justice Kennedy found the recognition power to be in this case,
“it ‘disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.’”41
Chief Justice Roberts read Justice Jackson’s framework much more strictly. Quoting from Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence, the Chief Justice observed that “[a]ssertions of exclusive and preclusive power leave
the Executive ‘in the least favorable of possible postures,’ and such claims have been scrutinized with caution
throughout this Court’s history.” Noting that “[f]or our first 225 years, no President prevailed when contradicting a statute in the field of foreign affairs,”42 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the category of exclusive

Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2085-86.
Id. at 8.
28 Id. at 9
29 Id. at 18.
30 See infra note 52-54 and accompanying text.
31 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
32 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 2 (2015).
34 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249.
35 Zivotofsky II, 135 S.Ct. at 2091.
36 Id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
37 Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
39 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
40 Zivotofsky II, 138 S.Ct. at 2113.
41 Id. at 2095 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 637–638 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
42 Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
26
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Presidential powers that would allow the President to disregard a contrary congressional act may be an empty
set.
The Chief Justice thus makes explicit a project only implied by his earlier treatment of Youngstown in Medellín.
That opinion seemed to narrow and formalize Youngstown’s categories, making Presidential action conflicting
with Congress’ prior acts—the third category—essentially forbidden.43 This followed Justice Stevens’ similar
treatment of Youngstown’s third category in Hamdan.44 The Chief Justice cites the rejection of Executive actions
in both those cases as support for his approach here.45
This shines new light on the Roberts-Kennedy foreign relations law fulcrum. Whereas Justice Kennedy has
been the Court’s supreme functionalist, Chief Justice Roberts has often seemed a less-than-committed formalist. While opinions in Medellín, Kiobel, and Bond all partake of formalist rhetoric, they each have functionalist
elements—a functional understanding of the United States’ intentions in ratifying the UN Charter, a functional
touch-and-concern test for jurisdiction in Alien Tort Statute cases, or a functional approach to the meaning of
“chemical weapons.” In Zivotofsky II, he writes in more uncompromisingly formalist terms. Were the Chief
Justice’s prior functionalist flourishes the price of Kennedy’s vote? Whether the earlier patterns of compromise
between Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts on such matters were conscious or unconscious, and
whether or not they were attempted in drafts in this case, will only be known when archives are opened.
III. Here be Dragons
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts both believe that foreign relations present existential dangers for
the United States. The two justices disagree fundamentally though on that danger’s primary source.
For Justice Kennedy, the primary source of danger is external. Foreign relations are complex, and perils for
the United States abound abroad. He began his opinion in Zivotofsky II by noting the delicacy of questions about
Jerusalem’s status. “Jerusalem’s political standing has long been, and remains, one of the most sensitive issues
in American foreign policy, and indeed it is one of the most delicate issues in current international affairs.”46
He later cited a letter from then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher observing that “[t]here is no issue
related to the Arab-Israeli negotiations that is more sensitive than Jerusalem.”47 Such sensitive issues, in turn,
require the Court to take a pragmatic approach to foreign relations law and Presidential authority. In this sense,
his majority opinion in Zivotofsky II reads much like his opinion in Arizona, which began by citing a former U.S.
Secretary of State’s views that immigration policy carried complex foreign relations implications that justified
authority and discretion in the political branches.48 And it reads like his Kiobel concurrence, pleading for flexibility in dealing with foreign relations cases.49
Boumediene might seem at odds with this outlook, using functionalist reasoning to restrain Congress and the
President. In fact though, it may be the flipside of the same coin as Zivotofsky II. If the Executive is constrained
only by functional considerations, the Executive is, at least practically, empowered to find those limits. Justice
Kennedy’s Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, using the same logic as Boumediene to approve the President’s actions,
demonstrates as much. And that is how lower courts have read it, finding few cases that meet Boumediene’s
standard for heightened scrutiny.
See Cohen, supra note 13, at 422-23.
Id. at 418.
45 Zivotofsky II, 138 S.Ct. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
46 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2085.
47 Id. (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. 28967 (1995) (letter to Robert Dole, Majority Leader, (June 20, 1995)).
48 Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2498 (relying on brief from former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright).
49 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
43
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For Justice Kennedy, there are dangers abroad, and the President must be authorized to defend the nation.
Justice Scalia describes Justice Thomas’ approach in concurrence as an endorsement of a presidency more
reminiscent of George III than George Washington.50 Justice Kennedy’s President is more St. George, tasked
with defending the realm from foreign dragons.
For Chief Justice Roberts, while external threats can pose grave dangers, the real risk is not foreign dragons
but a Leviathan: a federal government, and in particular an Executive, that uses foreign danger as an excuse to
engorge its power at home and to engage in reckless adventurism abroad. Federal foreign relations power must
be restrained. A stricter Youngstown test that leaves less room for Executive branch aggrandizement and congressional silence, a stricter political question doctrine that leaves fewer acts beyond judicial scrutiny, stricter
rules of statutory interpretation that require greater precision from Congress and leave less room for prosecutorial discretion and judicial foreign policy—these are the key moves in Chief Justice Roberts’ foreign relations
law jurisprudence.
IV. A Return to Foreign Affairs Functionalism and Exceptionalism?
Assuming the Court has been moving away from functionalist approaches to foreign relations law that had
long made the area “exceptional,”51 embracing formalist tools to rein in the broad discretion long-wielded by
the political branches, does Zivotofsky II, Justice Kennedy’s break with the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy’s
ability to gather a majority around his functionalist opinion auger a change in the Court’s direction? The last
two Justice Kennedy functionalist interventions, Boumediene and Arizona did little to stop the rushing path towards formalism and constraint in foreign relations law.
Moreover, Zivotofky II is not without formalist flourishes. Justice Kennedy tried to narrow the decision “solely
to exclusive power of the President to control recognition determinations” and congressional attempts to force
the President to contradict his own statements. 52 More notably, the majority distinguished their holding from
the Government’s argument that “the President has ‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ along
with ‘the bulk of foreign-affairs,’”53 and formally disavowed the common use of Curtiss-Wright’s dicta recognizing the President as “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” as a
source of “broad, undefined [Presidential] powers over foreign affairs.” 54 Together, the narrowing of the opinion and the disavowal of Curtiss-Wright might suggest that the rest of the majority has not entirely lost its
appetite for formalism and constraint. Those caveats may have been the price of their votes.
Zivotofsky II also presents a somewhat unique case for the Roberts Court, one in which the President and
Congress were truly at odds. This Court seems as interested in reining in Congress as the Executive,55 and it is
clear that for the majority, Congress’s attempt to make policy with regard to Jerusalem was an “improper act”
to “‘aggrandiz[e] its power at the expense of another branch.’”56 And the substantive outcome of this case also
likely mattered. Justice Kennedy and the four justices who joined his opinion likely believe that Jerusalem’s
status is a sensitive foreign policy question best left to the President. If they did not, they could have joined
Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015).
52 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2099.
53 Id. at 2089 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 18, 16).
54 Id.
55 Cohen, supra note 13, at 441 n.426 and passim.
56 Zivotofsky II, 132 S.Ct. at 2096 (internal citation omitted). One might wonder whether Congressional conflicts with the Executive
then in the news, like Speaker of the House John Boehner’s invitation to Israel Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to address Congress
or Senator Tom Cotton’s letter to Iran, were on the majority’s mind when they considered whether Congress needed to be reined in.
50
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Justice Scalia’s dissent, which laid out a narrow route to deciding the case—a narrow route to a loss for the
President. Zivotofsky II might not tell us very much about cases not about Jerusalem.57
Nonetheless, the logic of Zivotofsky II is certainly at odds with trends toward formalism, constraint, or normalization. The majority in Zivotofsky II largely undoes Justice Stevens’ and Chief Justice Roberts’ efforts to
narrow and formalize Justice Jackson’s three Youngstown categories, reopening the possibility that even when
Congress speaks, the President may disregard it. Moreover, the logic of the opinion, including its invocation of
the need for “one voice” in foreign relations, is extraordinarily broad. Regardless of what the majority believes,
the boundaries of that logic are hard to discern. For example, the same functional arguments made by Justice
Kennedy in favor of an exclusive recognition power could be made in favor of an exclusive Commander-inChief power: regardless of the range of congressional powers with regard to the military and war-making, the
President is necessary to bring them into effect. Can congressional attempts to regulate war-fighting, perhaps
by imposing time-limits, bans on tactics or weapons, or prohibitions on ground-troops simply be ignored by
Presidents?58
The majority may think it knows the answer and that its decision in Zivotofsky II truly is narrow. But policing
that unspoken boundary depends on the Court reviewing these cases, something it is unlikely to do. As Jack
Goldsmith suggests,59 the real concern might be how the Government itself will read this opinion, and while
the Office of Legal Counsel may mourn the death of Curtiss-Wright, the mourning period will be short, and the
Executive Branch may move on quickly to Zivotofsky II and arguments about exclusive powers and one voice.
The other question Zivotofsky II raises for prevailing trends regards future grants of certiorari. For those who
voted to grant certiorari in cases like Bond and Zivotofsky on the hopes that the time was right to reconsider
broad functionalist doctrines with regard to treaties or the recognition power, those efforts may now appear to
have been turned back twice (maybe three times if one counts the doors left open in Kiobel). If a Justice is
worried that other cases will turn out like Bond and Zivotofsky, the appetite for revisiting such cases may disappear. Without grants of certiorari, Zivotofsky II’s legacy will be left to lower courts. It is easy to imagine lower
courts invoking Zivotofsky II as an all-purpose justification for functionalist foreign relations deference to the
Executive much as they invoked the political question doctrine before Zivotofsky I.

57 Commitment to a substantive outcome, in that case, granting Guantanamo detainees access to habeas review, might explain the
majority’s decision to join Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene.
58 Notably, Chief Justice Roberts in dissent cites Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), a case suggesting that the President is required to
abide by congressional limits on war-making.
59 Jack Goldsmith, Why Zivotofsky Is a Significant Victory for the Executive Branch, LAWFARE, (June 8, 2015, 3:44 PM).

